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Due to the ever-increasing amounts under management and their unregulated and opaque nature, 
hedge funds have emerged as a key concern for policymakers. While until now, hedge funds have 
been left essentially unregulated, we are seeing increasing calls for regulation for both microprudential
and macroprudential reasons.
In our view, most calls for the regulation of hedge funds are based on a misperception of the effectiveness 
of ﬁ   nancial regulations, perhaps coupled with a lack of understanding of the positive contribution
of hedge funds to the ﬁ  nancial system. 
There are real concerns about consumer protection following from the expansion of the consumer base. 
However, it would be misguided to relax accreditation criteria. A more important issue is the investment
of regulated institutions, in particular pension funds, in hedge funds. Since such institutions to enjoy 
direct or indirect government protection, the investment in hedge funds has to be regulated. However,
such regulations are best implemented on the demand side by the pension fund regulator, rather than
by directly regulating the hedge fund advisors themselves.
Hedge funds provide considerable beneﬁ  ts, not only to their investors and advisors, but more importantly 
to the economy at large by facilitating price discovery, market efﬁ  ciency, diversiﬁ  cation, and by being 
potentially able to put a ﬂ  oor under a crisis, a function not easily implemented by regulated institutions
due to a minimum capital ratios, relative performance evaluation and other considerations.
It would however be imprudent to leave hedge fund advisors completely unregulated since the failure
of a systematically important hedge fund has the potential to create such uncertainty as to impede trading 
and in a worst case scenario cause signiﬁ  cant damage to the real economy.
These issues cannot be addressed by standard regulatory methodology such as disclosure and activity 
restrictions. Indeed, supervisors would be well advised to leave the hedge fund sector unregulated in their 
normal day-to-day activities. However, the regulator needs to have the power to resolve the informational 
uncertainty caused by the failure of a systematically important hedge funds. Prime brokers and other client 
banks would in such a scenario have a de facto or a de jure obligation to participate in the expedient removal 
of the uncertainty. To this end targeted consultation and contingency planning is essential.ARTICLES
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H
edge funds have emerged as a key concern 
to policymakers due to the ever-growing 
amounts under management coupled with 
concerns about their opaqueness. Consequently, the 
current status of hedge funds as one of the few largely 
unregulated entities1 within the ﬁnancial system is 
increasingly being challenged, and we expect to see 
some forms of hedge fund regulation in the near future. 
Unfortunately, most demands for the regulation
of hedge funds are based on a misperception
of both their threat to the economy and beneﬁts to the 
ﬁnancial system, as well as on overconﬁdence in the 
efﬁ  ciency and accuracy of ﬁnancial regulations. 
Most calls for the regulation of hedge funds are based 
on misperceptions about the effectiveness of ﬁnancial 
regulations, perhaps coupled with general mistrust 
of markets and an inﬂated belief in the effectiveness 
of government policy, perhaps by anchoring this 
belief in the success of regulation from experiences 
in unrelated sectors, such as trafﬁ  c. Furthermore, 
calls for regu  lation seem to be strongest in countries 
where the hedge funds have gotten in the way
of vested interests, such as in Germany.
The failure of large hedge funds, such as Amaranth, 
has been used to justify the need for regulations. 
However, the failure of Amaranth, one of the largest 
hedge fund failures of all times, may have proven just 
the opposite. It brought home the risk of investing in 
the hedge fund sector while the orderly resolution 
of its failure demonstrated that the system is able 
to cope with sizable failures and with substantial, 
illiquid and concentrated positions. Indeed, the 
case of Amaranth may indicate that further macro 
prudential regulations are not needed.
Hedge funds do however contribute to systemic 
risk whereby the failure of a systematically 
important hedge fund has the potential to create 
sufﬁ  cient uncertainty in the markets for liquidity 
to dry up and for trading to cease with potentially 
costly consequences. It is this externality that any 
regulations would need to address.
At the same time, hedge funds do provide considerable 
beneﬁts not only to their principals and investors, 
but more importantly to the economy at large. 
They make ﬁnancial markets more effcient than 
they otherwise would be, and they are in principle 
able to trade during ﬁnancial crises. This potentially 
enables them to provide a ﬂoor under prices, 
something which regulated institutions may not be 
able to, perhaps due to Basel type minimal capital 
ratios. In turn this might reduce return correlations 
in downturns and provide diversiﬁcation beneﬁts to 
the economy at large.
Existing regulations as applied to other ﬁnancial 
institutions are not likely to be effective for regulating 
hedge funds. Activity restrictions, such as leverage 
or short-sale constraints, or disclosure will either 
negate the economic bene  ﬁts contributed by hedge 
funds or would not be effective since they would 
not internalize the perceived externalities, others 
may be more dangerous still, offering only a veneer 
of protection, such as its registration requirements. 
On top of that, there always remains some risk that 
localized regulation causes hedge fund advisors to 
relocate to more favorable jurisdictions, removing 
regulatory oversight further.
As argued by Daníelsson et al. (2006), regulating 
hedge funds for reasons of consumer protection 
would be a mistake, where any regulatory system 
needs to recognize the beneﬁts from hedge funds. 
Consequently they argue that any regulation
of hedge funds should target the speciﬁc systemic 
concerns and not impede their day to day operations. 
The best way to achieve this goal is to have in place 
an effective resolution process to deal with the 
potential of systemic consequences from a hedge 
fund failure by means of a rapid unwinding process. 
The regulator furthermore needs to have a clear idea 
of the systemically important hedge funds, their 
prime brokers and main counterparties. 
1| MICROPRUDENTIAL CONCERNS
Hedge funds have traditionally attracted investments 
from accredited investors, i.e., individuals who are 
sufﬁ  ciently wealthy. Since such investors neither 
demand nor require government protection, hedge 
funds remained unregulated. In this context, we 
can view hedge funds as an extension of individual 
investors’ investment activities. As long as hedge 
1  Hedge funds are of course not entirely unregulated since they are, among others, subjected to the regulations of the exchanges on which they trade. ARTICLES
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fund investments were limited to accredited 
investors and assets under management by hedge 
funds were relatively small, hedge funds remained 
under the radar.
However, in recent years the investor class of hedge 
funds has broadened considerably, raising concerns. 
First, accreditation requirements have relaxed over 
time and in some countries few if any limits exist 
on who can invest in hedge funds. Second, regulated 
institutions investing on behalf of third parties, in 
particular pension funds, are increasingly investing 
in hedge funds, further raising concerns.
Retail Investors. The traditional investor base of 
hedge funds consists of wealthy individuals while 
smaller retail investors have been limited to the 
regulated funds, such as mutual funds. Retail investors 
have traditionally been protected by regulations 
because it was felt that they lacked sophis  tication to 
make investment choices without adequate disclosure 
and limits on funds activities. In recent years the 
boundaries between the two investor groups has 
been breaking down, the accreditation requirements 
in the United States have until recently remained 
static in nominal terms, and some countries, such as 
Australia, do not impose restrictions on hedge fund 
investments. We now simultaneously see calls for 
increasing retailization of hedge funds and for some 
form of protection alongside it.
The arguments in favor of retailization are generally 
based on fairness. Why should only the wealthy 
be allowed to enjoy superior hedge fund returns? 
Indeed, it appears sometimes that certain supervisors 
have called for retailization, rather than the hedge 
fund advisors or the retail investors.
We however feel that retailization cannot be 
recommended. There are good reasons why mutual 
funds catering to retail investors are regulated, and 
subsequent to large investment losses by the general 
public we observe clamoring for increased regulation. 
Indeed, following the collapse of Amaranth there 
where some calls in that direction. In the long run 
we do not see unregulated hedge funds catering to 
retail investors as a viable concept. We are therefore 
heartened by the recent SEC decision to strengthen 
accreditation requirements to USD 2.5 million 
excluding the investor’s home.
This does not mean that retail investors need to be 
entirely excluded from hedge fund investments. 
First, hedge funds advisors increasingly offer 
standard “regulated” products, such as long-only or 
130-30 funds. Such funds may be regulated without 
the hedge fund advisor being regulated, yet offering 
access to talented investment professionals.
Second, hedge fund replicators, funds that mimic the 
return characteristics of hedge fund indices, have 
some promise in offering hedge fund like returns 
at lower costs and more transparency. Just as with 
structured products, it should be possible to regulate 
replicators via precise rules based term sheets to an 
extent deemed acceptable for retailization. While such 
products would be unlikely to generate much alpha, 
they potentially do provide the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts 
that seem to have become the primary incentive to 
invest in hedge funds in recent months.
Regulated institutions. Regulated institutions, in 
particular pension funds, are increasingly investing 
in hedge funds. This raises legitimate concerns, 
whether such investments are consistent with 
the mandate of pension funds, in particular the 
risk proﬁle, and whether pension fund managers 
are sufﬁciently sophisticated to understand the 
investment choices. Indeed, since pension funds 
are regulated and generally are underwritten by the 
government, either explicitly or implicitly, these are 
legitimate concerns. If pension funds continue were 
to invest aggressively in hedge funds in the current 
regulatory environment, we feel it is inevitable that 
the hedge fund industry will be regulated following 
the next big loss.
However, that would be the wrong approach to 
regulation. The public concern is with pension funds 
not fulﬁlling their mandates, but not with hedge 
funds. Consequently, the regulations should be on 
the demand side not the supply side. The regulators 
for pension funds should specify the requirements 
for investments in hedge funds, such as disclosure, 
investment amounts and risk. Hedge fund advisors 
may then decide whether to agree to such a mandate. ARTICLES
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2| MACROPRUDENTIAL CONCERNS
The main concerns about the hedge funds relate 
to macroprudential issues, in particular ﬁnancial 
stability. These concerns were identiﬁed by 
Daníelsson et al. (2006).
2|1 Common  concerns
Destabilization. Hedge funds have been accused 
of destabilizing individual markets or even entire 
countries, such as in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. 
This is sometimes known as the Mahatir Conjecture. 
However, the evidence following the Asian crisis 
indicates that it was the local corporations who were 
the ﬁrst to move money out of their countries, and 
hedge funds, if anything, seemed to have supported 
the currencies.2
Leverage. Hedge funds are sometimes accused
of amassing too much leverage. This was an accusation 
leveled at the LTCM in 1998. Considering that under 
Basel I regulated banks are allowed to 12 times 
leverage and that most hedge funds operate with 
much lower leverage than that, leverage concerns 
seemed to be broadly unfounded.3 Furthermore, we 
only observe extreme levels of leverage at times
of a fund going under, as capital is vanishing.
Counterparty risk. There are concerns that because 
of their opaque nature, counterparties may not have 
suffcient information about the counterparty risk 
arising from hedge fund exposures. This was a key 
concern in the LTCM crisis. However, as a consequence, 
prime brokers have monitored hedge fund positions 
carefully with a view to better understand and 
hedge such risk. In addition, hedge funds are
marked-to-market and mostly need to provide 
appropriate collateral. While some concerns remain, 
for instance due to the endogenous value of collateral 
posted, it seems that even the counterparty risk of 
the largest of hedge funds should currently not pose 
a serious threat to their trading partners.
Herding. We expect the most sophisticated hedge 
funds to lead the curve in implementing new 
trading strategies and investing in new assets and 
markets. Indeed, since ﬂexibility and costly technical 
sophistication is the raisons d’être for such hedge funds 
they can be expected to lead rather than follow others 
and herd. There is however concern that smaller 
and less sophisti  cated hedge funds may opt to follow 
copycat strategies and herd. Generally, however, 
hedge funds are less likely to herd than other investors, 
such as mu  tual funds, insurance companies, banks 
and pension funds for reasons such as the absence of 
relative and benchmarked compensation schedules 
and the absence of governmental bail-outs. 
Market liquidity. Hedge funds have been accused 
of being a user rather than a provider of valuable 
liquidity. Indeed, if a hedge fund is a large seller 
of an asset, perhaps forced by marking-to-market, 
or ampliﬁed by some hedge fund styles that imply 
the pursuit of similar strategies such as convertible 
arbitrage, it may have a signiﬁcant price impact. 
However, compared to the rest of the market, hedge 
funds are more likely to be willing to trade, and thus 
are more likely to supply liquidity than simply use 
it up. Indeed, the presence of hedge funds in credit 
derivatives has allowed banks to issue more credit 
instruments and price them more fairly.
Fraud. The opaque nature of hedge funds and 
the occasionally long lock-in periods may make it 
easier for hedge funds to commit fraud. However, 
there is little evidence of hedge funds committing 
disproportionately much fraud.4 Overall, in the 
ﬁrst half of this decade, the SEC brought 51 cases 
against hedge funds, charging them with defrauding 
investors of more than one billion. This is still a 
small fraction of overall hedge fund investments. 
Furthermore, theft is illegal and criminal law may 
be sufﬁ  cient to deal with hedge fund fraud. 
2  See e.g. Choe et al. (1998); Fung and Hsieh (2000); Fung et al. (2000); Goetzmann et al. (2000). 
3  Gupta and Liang (2004) ﬁnd that less than 4% of live and 11% of dead hedge funds in their sample would have violated the Basel II capital adequacy requirements 
as of March 2003, with the under-capitalized funds relatively small. 
4  CFTC estimates suggest that in the ﬁve years up to 2003 hedge funds accounted for around 2% of SEC and CFTC enforcement actions (Testimony of Patrick J McCarty,
General Counsel, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in SEC, 2003). Also, the case of the Bayou hedge fund fraud is well known, with losses up
to half a billion dollars.ARTICLES
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2|2  The real concerns
The main systemic concerns about hedge funds 
relate to the potential for the failure of a systemically 
important —i.e. a sufﬁ  ciently large, opaque, and 
sophisticated— fund (or group of funds). Such a 
failure threatens to create considerable uncertainty. 
In this case it is not solely the size of the fund that 
matters but rather the opaqueness of its positions and 
the information uncertainty it causes in the markets. 
This may cause trading to be severely curtailed and 
market prices to be poor indicators of value. This is 
exactly what happened following LTCM in 1998. In 
turn these distorted valuations might lead to further 
inefﬁ  cient allocations, preventing assets to be held 
by the institutions having the highest marginal 
valuations due to poor liquidity. A crisis may even 
lead to credit events involving institutions that are 
not directly affected by the hedge funds’ operations, 
but whose collateral may become damaged as a 
result. Such repercussions can therefore affect Main 
Street over and above Wall Street. In such a situation 
the hedge funds do not bear all the costs of such an 
event, which creates an externality that has to be 
addressed. The backlash could be on par with the 
policy mistakes following the stock market crash
of 1929 and the Great Depression. 
3| BENEFITS FROM HEDGE FUNDS
Hedge funds provide beneﬁts to the ﬁnancial system 
and the economy at large by making ﬁnancial 
markets more efﬁ  cient and provide liquidity in 
times of ﬁnancial crisis. Daníelsson et al. (2006) 
outline these beneﬁts.
Price discovery and the invisible hand.
Hedge funds aid price discov  ery by employing 
considerable resources for market research. When 
hedge funds trade with their proprietary research 
information, they affect prices and volumes and 
thus reveal some of this information to the market, 
helping (perhaps otherwise under-researched) 
assets stay close to fundamental val  ues. This in turn 
beneﬁts the entire ﬁnancial system, allow allocating 
trades to happen that otherwise would not take 
place. Furthermore, their trading activities increase 
competitive pressures on the spreads of market 
makers and other intermediaries.
Diversiﬁcation. The regulated sector of the 
investment universe is gener  ally limited by a range 
of regulations in what they can and cannot invest 
in. Consequently, out of the possible combinations 
of risk and return, the regu  lated sector can only 
provide products covering part of that range. 
Investors seeking different combinations of risk 
and return have either the option of managing the 
money themselves or delegating the investment 
decisions to somebody, i.e., a hedge fund.
Market clearing and liquidity. Daníelsson and 
Zigrand (2006) identify the speciﬁc implications of 
keeping some ﬁnancial institutions, such as hedge 
funds, unregulated when the remainder of the 
ﬁnancial system is subject to regulations, e.g., Basel 
style minimum capital. If the economy is hit by a 
liquidity induced ﬁnancial shock, regulated ﬁnancial 
institutions are required to get rid of more risky 
assets. If all market actors are regulated, then there 
is no counterparty at any price and the ﬁnancial 
crisis episode is likely to become much deeper than 
than it otherwise would become.
4| POLICY OPTIONS I 
The authorities have a range of options available when 
deciding how to best address the issue of regulating 
hedge funds. The key challenge is that standard 
ﬁnancial regulatory methodology, developed with 
problems such as con  sumer protection and bank runs 
in mind, is not directly applicable to hedge funds.
Restrict or shut them down. The authorities 
always have the option of closing down the hedge 
fund industry in their respective jurisdiction, and 
indeed some authorities have expressed a desire to 
do exactly that. This however would be a mistake, 
as argued above. Furthermore, in countries where 
the calls for a heavy regulation of hedge funds 
are the loudest, such as Germany, the criticism of 
hedge funds seems to originate from them exposing 
weaknesses in corporate governance.
Furthermore, it is not clear how the authorities could 
restrict or close down the hedge fund sector given 
global anonymous markets. Not only is it not clear 
how such a restriction could be enforced offshore, it 
also raises concerns about economic discrimination. ARTICLES
Jón Daníelsson and Jean-Pierre Zigrand: “Regulating hedge funds”
34  Banque de France • Financial Stability Review – Special issue on hedge funds • No. 10 • April 2007
If the regulated institutions and private in  dividuals
are able to conduct most type of investments, how 
can outsourcing be banned?
Among the envisaged restrictions most applicable 
to hedge funds are leverage constraints. But as 
argued above, most hedge funds hold leverage that 
is much lower than that, usually between one and 
two, and very high leverage ratios are observed only 
when a hedge fund is in serious trouble. Leverage 
furthermore is difﬁ  cult to monitor accurately, let 
alone to compare across ﬁrms, time and products, 
and it also is not clear regulators want to be made 
responsible for this. Also, it is by-and-large in the 
interest of prime brokers to monitor leverage. Finally, 
uniform leverage constraints would impede the 
hedge funds’ role of improving upon the efﬁ  ciency 
of markets and may add to the procyclicality and 
instability of markets.
Laissez–faire. Not addressing the issue of the 
regulatory status of hedge funds is equally misguided. 
As discussed above, there are real systemic concerns 
from hedge funds since the full costs of such an 
event could be quite sizable and would not be borne 
by the hedge fund itself.
Disclosure. The second main regulatory tool 
is compulsory disclosure, both privately to the 
supervisor and publicly to clients. Perhaps the main 
impetus for regulating hedge funds today is focused 
on disclosure. In banking, disclosure is useful, e.g.
by enabling regulators to monitor compliance with 
activity restrictions and provide protection for 
unsophisticated retail clients. Neither issue is relevant 
for hedge funds. Indeed, in most calls for disclosure 
it is not clear what the objective is. Furthermore, 
some hedge funds, and in particular those who 
arouse systemic concerns, operate at the highest 
end of the technology curve, frustrating attempts to 
obtain useful information by disclosure.
One option on disclosure is private disclosure to the 
supervisor of detailed position level information 
or output from the risk engines. A technically 
sophisticated hedge fund specializes in localized 
risk management, and will have a unique risk 
management system. By contrast, the supervisor 
specializes in global risk management and would not 
only need to understand the risk of an individual 
hedge fund but would in addition need to aggregate 
these risk across other similar funds, a task that 
would seem to be all but impossible today. With the 
enormous trading volume and frequent style changes, 
it is akin to trying to drink from a ﬁre hose.
The alternative is public disclosure of aggregate 
performance or risk information to either investors5
or the public at large. This however is again fraught 
with challenges, especially for the more sophisticated 
and systemat  ically important funds. For example, 
even simple carry trades can provide a low volatility 
revenue stream for a considerable time, but then can 
go spec  tacularly wrong, such as the yen dollar carry 
in October 1998. Indeed, such strategies imply that 
volatility or value-at-risk can be seriously misleading 
as a measure of risk. 
Reliance on prime brokers. Prime brokers 
provide banking services to hedge funds. Since 
prime brokers operate in the regulated part of the 
ﬁnancial system it is sometimes proposed that they 
be used as a regulatory tool. This however misses the 
point about the relationship between prime brokers 
and hedge funds. It is true that the incentives of 
the prime brokers are to maintain the symbiotic 
relationship with the fund, and any potential 
problems with an individual hedge fund are likely 
to be discussed privately and resolved with the fund 
itself. But any prime broker viewed as an extension 
of the regulator would be viewed with suspicion by 
the hedge fund clients. Finally, regulatory arbitrage 
may induce prime brokers to relocate to unregulated 
ﬁnancial centres, removing any sort of intelligent 
conversations between them and regulators. 
Registration. In some jurisdictions hedge funds are 
required to register with authorities and there have 
been calls for registration requirements elsewhere, 
e.g. in the United States. While this has been struck 
down in courts, it is likely that the incoming Congress 
will give the SEC the power to require registration 
along with some disclosure. The beneﬁts of blanket 
registration are generally hard to ascertain, but on 
the costs side it does induce moral hazard.
Targeted consultation. It is however essential for 
the authorities to have a clear view of the scope of 
the hedge fund sector, both operating within their 
jurisdiction, as well as globally. This requires the 
5  Hedge fund investors, such as funds-of-funds, bargain over the extent of voluntary disclosure along with issues such as fees and liquidity. If the bargaining power 
is on the investors side, the funds are likely to agree to more disclosure. ARTICLES
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authorities to be precise about what their information 
needs are. A good example of this is the FSA which 
maintains oversight of 31 of the largest hedge fund 
managers in Britain (50% of assets). Such thematic 
supervision covers a wide range of entities that have 
hedge fund mandates, and includes a regular survey 
of the main London prime brokers. 
5| POLICY OPTIONS II
For the regulations to be effective and not too 
costly they need to focus directly on the externality 
meriting regulations, i.e., the potential failure of a 
systematically important fund or group of funds. 
Consequently, the object of the regulations is not 
to regulate the ongoing activities of an individual 
fund, but rather to address the failures. As discussed 
above, the systemic risk arising from hedge funds is 
liquidity and credit risk, including the endogenous 
and potentially pro-cyclical values of any collateral, 
induced by uncertainty about positions and how 
they get resolved. 
Since the externalities cannot easily be prevented 
ex-ante without effectively shutting funds down,
the best way this can be achieved is by having a 
robust resolution process in place in case a fund 
fails and the fund’s positions need to be unwound. 
Client banks, prime brokers, and regulators may 
not be inclined to participate in such a process, or 
prefer to draw it out. The pro  cess therefore needs to 
be formalized, and there is little doubt in our minds 
that the regulators in the major ﬁnancial centers 
then have the power to initiate such a process. 
While this may be viewed as accelerated bankruptcy 
process, the immediate key issue is rather to 
remove the uncertainty than to accurately resolve 
the ﬁnal payoffs to the various counterparties.
As with LTCM, Amaranth and others, sophisticated 
investment banks may be will  ing to take over parts 
of the affected hedge fund, after inspecting balance 
sheets and trading books. This is standard practice 
in banking. If no single bank has the required 
liquidity, such as with multiple failures, the 
monetary authorities might inject liquidity through 
a discount window. At the same time the supervisors 
do need to have contingency plans in place, and 
have an understanding of who the key players are. 
There also is a sense of urgency that might not exist 
in other crises. This is why targeted consultation 
is useful. Simulated crisis events, or stress tests,
as performed by the Bank of England, the FSA, 
the Eurosystem Central Banks, and others, can be 
invaluable in planning for such contingencies. 
Hedge funds have emerged as an integral part of the modern ﬁnancial sys  tem, simultaneously making 
the ﬁnancial system more efﬁ  cient and inducing systemic risk. While the systemic risk needs to be 
addressed by supervisors, it is essential that it be done without negating the efﬁ  ciency beneﬁts provided
by hedge funds. In this, rather than targeting the ongoing activities of hedge funds with traditional regulations 
such as activity restrictions and disclosures, it is sufﬁ  cient and perhaps optimal to directly target the 
externality induced by hedge funds. The optimal regulatory regime for hedge funds directly targets this 
externality by having in place a robust resolution process in case a systemically important hedge fund
or group of hedge funds trigger a systemic event. ARTICLES
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